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This article argues that multinational banks have characteristics which are 
unique and distinguishable from traditional multinational entities. The first 
distinguishing feature is the unique nature of the services and consequent 
products supplied by multinational banks, which are aimed at meeting client 
global demand. The second distinguishing feature is the non-traditional 
organisational structure that is adopted. This structure, also designed to 
meet client global demand, introduces issues previously not recognised in 
the traditional taxation system, which is designed for the structure of 
traditional multinational entities. The unique differences between 
traditional multinational entities and multinational banks means there may 
be the need for a distinct international tax regime. It is argued that there 
are “outmoded economic assumptions” upon which the present tax laws 
relating to multinational banks are based. An examination of the unique 
nature of multinational banks leads to the conclusion that the appropriate 
tax treatment of these banks is different from the appropriate tax treatment 
of multinational entities generally.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
All multinational entities are subject to specific tax rules which require the distribution of 
income between the relevant jurisdictions to be determined under the transfer pricing 
provisions according to an arm’s length price. This requirement is a product of both 
domestic law and tax treaties and is the accepted standard for the allocation of income 
within a multinational entity. Multinational banks are no exception and therefore must 
comply with this arm’s length requirement. However, it is arguable that multinational banks 
do not have the same characteristics as a traditional multinational entity. Where this is the 
case, and the multinational bank does not fit within the traditional multinational entity 
framework, the problems associated with the application of the transfer pricing regime and 
the arm’s length requirement are exacerbated.  
 The purpose of this article is to examine whether the underlying rationale for taxing 
multinational banks in the same manner as their more traditional counterparts is correct. The 
reason for such an examination is that it may be argued that multinational banks pose 
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 particularly significant challenges to the current tax regime because of its inadequate 
jurisdictional (sourcing) and allocation (transfer pricing) rules.1 The traditional banking 
business of borrowing and on-lending money creates difficulties from a tax perspective 
when undertaken in a multinational setting. The difficulties are multiplied when a bank 
carries out a global trading role.2  
 Within the context of multinational banking, it is argued that there are “outmoded 
economic assumptions”3 upon which the present tax laws relating to multinational banks are 
based.4 It is argued that the present regime, applicable to multinational banks, lacks the 
requirements of an equitable tax regime; in particular, the requirement of consistency, 
distorting capital allocation within the financial markets. That is, the traditional international 
tax regime governing jurisdiction and allocation is composed of legal concepts and 
constructs that fail to reflect the economic realities of multinational entities in general5 and 
multinational banks in particular. 
 This article proposes that multinational banks be excepted from the current regime and 
subject to discrete regulation. This proposition is not normally espoused. Rather, it is 
generally accepted that new financial instruments are the leading example of the current 
difficulties in the international tax regime.6 This new type of market has brought to the 
attention of tax administrators the discrepancies in the traditional tax regime, highlighting 
the inability of the regime to deal with modern financial transactions.7 While this article 
maintains the former proposition, the latter is not inconsistent and, as such, is acknowledged. 
 The argument put forward in this article is that the current international taxation rules 
governing jurisdiction and allocation of income for multinational entities in general are not 
optimal for taxing multinational banks. As such, it is essential to establish that there are 
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fundamental differences between traditional multinational entities and multinational banks. 
The unique nature of multinational banks is considered to demonstrate how these differences 
assist in the distortion of the allocation of taxing rights.  
 This article first considers the background to this issue and establishes the fundamental 
reason for considering the unique nature of multinational banks. It also considers the role of 
the multinational bank in a global economy and establishes the two core differences, or 
distinguishing features, between multinational entities in general and multinational banks, 
and why they have an impact on taxation, particularly in failing to arrive at a result which 
reflects economic reality. The article then offers a solution that should be investigated. It 
concludes that multinational banks are unique in nature. For taxation purposes, therefore, or, 
more specifically, in order to examine whether the current regime is optimal, resulting in a 
reflection of economic reality, this article concludes that multinational banks should be 
considered separately from traditional multinational entities for taxation purposes. 
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MULTINATIONAL BANKS FROM A FISCAL PERSPECTIVE 
Whether multinational banks undertake traditional banking business or the more innovative 
and modern business of global trading, they are creating taxation issues that have previously 
gone largely unnoticed.8 However, due to an increase in both the emerging taxation issues 
and the number of multinational banks globally, these problems are now being considered. 
Initially, the taxation of these banks was not a significant issue due to the small number of 
multinational banks in existence. Internationally, it was not until 1984 that the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) specifically addressed some of the 
substantive transfer pricing issues relating to multinational banks.9 In July 2008, the OECD 
issued a report on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments (branches), which 
updates the issues and situations described in the 1984 report.10 The 2008 report also deals 
with particular issues and situations arising from the widespread financial liberalisation and 
globalisation of financial markets, which have been such a feature of the global economy in 
the late 20th century.11  
 The global expansion of multinational banks has had ramifications for domestic 
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have had to address the increase in multinational banking 
by undertaking legislative changes regarding their regulatory control. Yet, little has been 
done to consider the tax consequences. Australia is an example of a jurisdiction which has 
faced this issue. Despite Australia’s banking industry undergoing substantial changes aimed 
at addressing its restrictive policy and encouraging foreign entry into Australia by non-
Australian financial institutions, little has been done to consider the taxation consequences 
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 of entry by these banks.12 Similarly, with this change in policy, Australian banks are 
entering foreign markets, with little government regard to the taxation consequences of such 
events. The loosening of regulatory restrictions has led to an increase in foreign banking 
activity. Along with deregulation, the communications revolution and technological change 
have had a significant effect on the increased globalisation of financial markets.13  
 The growth of multinational banks, without a consideration of the international taxation 
rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income, means there is a very real 
possibility that multinational banks may not be taxed in an optimal manner. More 
specifically, the current regime may not be distributing the taxing rights in an equitable 
manner between the relevant jurisdictions,14 while simultaneously failing to allow decisions 
of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic 
concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept.15 A neutral tax system is one in which tax 
rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be 
across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary 
focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality, also known as economic efficiency.16  
 An optimal regime also strives to achieve equity between taxpayers. In order to achieve 
inter-taxpayer equity in multinational banking, it is imperative that domestic and 
international banks, as well as bank and non-bank entities, are taxed similarly. Inter-taxpayer 
equity is not achieved where there is distortion through double taxation or less than single 
taxation.  
 It is not the purpose of this article to outline the tax regime applicable to multinational 
banks but, rather, to demonstrate their unique nature, which in turn supports the argument 
that they should be considered separately for the purposes of a tax regime. However, to 
demonstrate the taxation problems arising out of the unique nature of multinational banks it 
is necessary to outline the broad tax principles.  
 As stated earlier, the current tax regime applies both jurisdictional allocation rules and 
transactional allocation rules17 based on a system originating in 1923. The current 
jurisdictional allocation rules considered are those of source, that is determining the source 
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of the income. The current transactional allocation rules considered are those of the transfer 
pricing regime requiring an arm’s length standard for transactions that occur between 
different parts of the one entity. 
 A robust source regime is required in any tax regime.18 However, the unique nature of 
multinational banks means that the traditional source regime does not meet this criteria as it 
fails to allocate income according to economic activity.19 It is argued that the cause of the 
failure of the traditional source regime, when applied to multinational banks, is twofold. The 
first failure of the regime is that it requires the classification of the income of multinational 
banks, which is based on historic legal notions of source. The second failure of the regime is 
that the unique nature of multinational banking means that income may be allocated to a 
particular geographical location different from the location of the economic activity.  
 The first failure arises because the current source regime requires each transaction to be 
examined in the context of the various possible categories of source of income. In the case 
of multinational banks, transactions often will not fit neatly into one of the legal 
classifications as these rules are designed with a reference point in the past.20 New and 
innovative financial instruments are being created at a rate far greater than the current tax 
regime can keep pace with. 
 The second cause of failure to allocate income based on economic activity is a result of 
the unique nature of multinational banks, which is discussed later in this article. The unique 
nature of the intermediation services offered by multinational banks means that these 
services may be undertaken in a geographical location different from that of the end product. 
Further exacerbating this problem is the fact that certain multinational entities, including 
multinational banks, no longer operate as distinct and separate parts of the one entity. 
Rather, they operate as integrated wholes, with the synergy gains explaining why this type 
of multinational entity has become so widespread. This article argues that it is this operation 
through integrated wholes that makes it difficult to apply the traditional source concept to 
the income of these multinational entities, as income cannot be associated with particular 
geographical locations.21 
 Also distorting the attribution of profits is the transactional allocation issues of transfer 
pricing. Profits of a jurisdiction may be distorted by a multinational entity by the separate 
but related parts of that entity transferring goods and services at differing prices. 
 The solution to transfer pricing devised by the OECD is arm’s length pricing. Each part 
of the multinational entity is treated as a separate part of the economic entity (whether it is a 
branch or a subsidiary) and a price is substituted that would have been used in the 
transaction if it had been with an unrelated third party rather than a related party within the 
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 same multinational entity. The OECD has, for many decades, provided its solution to the 
manipulation of transfer pricing but it has also recognised the increasing significance of this 
manipulation in recent years. As a response to increased cross-border transactions and 
multinational enterprise operations, the OECD revised its international transfer pricing 
guidelines (OECD Guidelines) in 1995.22 The current guidelines represent a consensus 
among 25 OECD member countries on the approach to international transfer pricing issues. 
 The arm’s length standard is based on what is referred to as the separate accounting or 
separate entity approach. The separate parts of an entity are defined by reference to national 
boundaries, or what is commonly referred to as the “water’s edge”.23 Income and expenses 
are allocated to the relevant jurisdictions on a transactional basis, that is, specific 
transactions are considered as if they were between distinct entities, with each entity 
reporting separate taxable income.24  
 To apply the current transfer pricing rules a two-step process must be followed. The first 
step is one of conceptual comparability to determine what the hypothetical distinct and 
separate enterprise would look like. It is argued that, in undertaking this step, a fiction is 
created in the case of multinational banks because of their unique features. The highly 
integrated nature of the multinational bank is considered a primary factor in the increasing 
difficulty in separating the component parts.25 The unique organisational structure adopted 
by multinational banks also contributes to the fiction, especially where the integrated trading 
model is adopted.26 The very reason for the existence of multinational banks often means 
that there will not be any arm’s length competitors.27 Further, it is difficult to allocate 
activities to the different parts of the multinational bank because the relationships between 
related parties are different to those of non-related parties.28  
 The second step is one of transactional comparability to determine the actual profits 
attributable to the subsidiary or branch of the multinational bank. It is claimed that there are 
three interrelated fictions in applying this step. The unique organisational structure and the 
highly integrated nature of multinational banks mean that often there is no direct evidence of 
comparisons in an uncontrolled situation.29 In addition, there is frequently an absence of 
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comparables because of the unique services provided by multinational banks.30 Finally, the 
type of inter and intra entity dealings for multinational banks are highly specialised and 
regularly intangible.31  
 It can be seen that in applying these principles, there are certain suppositions underlying 
the traditional international rules governing jurisdiction and allocation. This article 
maintains that these suppositions are not accurate for multinational banks. The three 
problematic assumptions underlying the current international tax system are that: it is 
possible to ascertain a geographical source for income;  it is possible to treat each part of a 
multinational entity as a separate unit and to allocate profits based on an arm’s length 
notion; and the place of incorporation is a matter of fundamental significance.32 
 Reality is somewhat different. A multinational bank operates globally and in an 
integrated manner, which makes it difficult to separate the entity into component parts. The 
consequence is that “there is no single source of income and separate accounting for each 
unit of a multinational is impossible”.33 The location of the multinational bank head office is 
not relevant to the profit location as income is derived from global operations.34 Any attempt 
to allocate income on these principles is “as Justice Brennan said in the Container case, like 
‘slicing a shadow’”.35 
 Before a detailed examination of the unique nature of multinational banks is undertaken 
to demonstrate that the traditional rationale for taxing these banks in the same manner as 
traditional multinational entities is flawed, the role of the multinational bank is considered. 
3. THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL BANK 
The role of the multinational bank as an entity is vastly different to that of traditional 
multinational enterprises. It is not in the business of providing a traditional product or 
service but, rather, acts as an intermediary. In the context of global trading, there are three 
major parties to transactions: capital users, capital suppliers and the financial 
intermediaries.36 Financial intermediaries, generally multinational banks, profit from 
intermediating between capital users and capital suppliers.37 The unique nature of 
intermediary services (and to a lesser extent the resultant products, or the innovative 
financial instruments which are used to deliver these services) performed by multinational 
banks are designed to meet client global demand. In this context, because one role of the 
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 multinational bank is that of intermediary, the product supplied by the bank is ancillary to 
the true nature of its business. The true nature of its business is the supply of services. The 
services provided through the intermediation between borrower and lender enables 
borrowers and investors to reconcile their different objectives.38  
 By acting as an intermediary, a multinational bank is in the unique position of being able 
to separate its services role from the legal contracts that give rise to profit. It can provide 
advice to clients in one jurisdiction, with those clients completing the transaction (depositing 
or borrowing money) in another jurisdiction. Thus, profits are shifted away from the 
economic activity to the location of the supply of the ancillary product.  
 A multinational bank has several sources of income, some of which stem from the 
intermediation service provided. The sources of income range from the interest and 
dividends received with respect to the securities it is required to maintain to be a market-
maker, to trading gains from sales of those securities.39 It also earns income from: notional 
principal contracts, and other over-the-counter derivatives entered into with clients; fee 
income from structuring transactions; gains from dealing in liabilities; income from stock 
lending and repo transactions; and broker’s fees from exchange transactions executed for 
clients.40 Multinational banks also play an important role in the maintenance of efficiency in 
the financial markets, not only by operating as intermediaries between borrowers and 
lenders but also by managing the risk from a portfolio of transactions.41 
 The process of global trading consists of a number of roles, which are undertaken by 
multinational banks to earn this income. These roles can be categorised into trading, sales 
and marketing, management, and supporting functions.42 Novel tax issues also arise because 
these functions may be conducted across a number of jurisdictions.43  
 The difference in the role of the multinational bank stems from the unique features 
associated with it. Each of the unique features is examined in turn. 
4. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE SERVICES AND CONSEQUENT PRODUCTS 
The first difference between a traditional multinational entity and a multinational bank is the 
services and consequent products supplied. The nature of the services and resultant products 
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provided by multinational banks is a response to clients’ needs in relation to which the banks 
undertake the intermediary role in the marketplace.  
 This unique feature is examined in three interrelated subcategories. The first 
subcategory looks at globalisation and the increase in global trading in the context of 
multinational banking in order to explain the functions of a multinational bank. This 
establishes the differences between the functions of the traditional multinational entity and 
the multinational bank, together with the differences between the multinational bank and 
purely domestic banks. The second subcategory considers the growth and evolution of the 
multinational bank, providing explanations for the rise of these entities. This part of the 
article considers the compulsion by banks to follow clients to international jurisdictions, 
along with the internalisation theory of undertaking multinational activities. The third 
subcategory examines the monopolistic nature of multinational banking, with the personal 
contact advantage providing synthesis of information. This is considered in order to 
establish further unique source and transfer pricing issues that arise with multinational 
banks. 
4.1 Globalisation and the increase in global trading 
To demonstrate the unique nature of multinational banking, it is necessary to define a 
multinational bank and consider the functions undertaken in the world market. This world 
market is continually changing with business becoming increasingly global, and borders 
becoming progressively meaningless to those partaking in the provision of services and 
products internationally.44 Different terminology has been used to describe these activities 
and, as such, it is necessary to consider what “multinational banking” means. 
 Trading in the international arena does not alone determine an entity to be multinational. 
A multinational entity deals internationally in a particular way, in that it is a business 
venture which “owns and controls income-generating assets in more than one country”45 or 
“an enterprise that owns and controls activities in different countries”.46 A multinational 
entity has been more comprehensively defined as: 
 [a] business created and owned by a group of private investors which is engaged in 
carrying out business and commercial activities in two or more states. A multinational 
corporation usually owns assets and conducts foreign trade and investment over a 
number of geographically, politically, and economically diverse countries.47 
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 It is not necessary, therefore, for an entity to be established in two or more jurisdictions to be 
involved in international trade, but this is necessary if that entity is to be classified as 
multinational. 
 An entity dealing in the international market, but not established in two or more 
jurisdictions, is not a multinational entity. Domestic entities may successfully trade in the 
international market other than as a multinational entity. For example, business conducted 
through an offshore agent or via a joint venture is not consistent with the definition of a 
multinational entity. Similarly, a firm that trades on the international market via an internet 
site is not within the definition of a multinational entity. Conversely, once an entity is 
established in two or more jurisdictions it is classified as multinational.48  
 It follows that a multinational bank is a multinational entity operating banking facilities. 
A multinational bank has been defined in very simple terms as “a bank that owns and 
controls banking activities in two or more countries”.49 Like all entities engaging in 
international business it must be determined whether the bank in question is truly 
multinational or merely international. A more concise definition of a multinational bank is 
one which encompasses foreign direct investment by the bank, as a parallel to the 
requirement that a multinational entity be established in two or more jurisdictions.  
 Multinational banks may also be considered in the context of globalisation to determine 
the functions performed. Globalisation and internationalisation are words that have recently 
become part of everyday language, and are usually used in the context of anything involving 
more than one jurisdiction. Globalisation, however, is more precise than this, as it involves 
the process by which the world becomes a single marketplace,50 and is a product of entities 
undertaking internationalisation, that is, dealing in the international market.51 Globalisation 
is one of the challenges facing tax authorities today and is a factor driving future tax 
policy,52 with the effects of globalisation having profound implications for tax systems.53 
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Globalisation has been described as the 20th century’s greatest economic event,54 yet it is a 
process that has existed for hundreds of years; it is only the extent and pace of change which 
is new.55 
 A multinational bank contributes to the globalisation of the financial market, and most 
engage in global trading. The OECD documents, in the context of the taxation of financial 
instruments, describe global trading as “[t]he catch-all phrase that focuses on the capacity of 
these financial institutions to execute customers orders in financial products in markets 
around the world and/or around the clock”.56 Plambeck similarly describes global trading as 
“the capacity of financial intermediaries to make markets and to take proprietary positions in 
financial markets around the world and around the clock”.57 Global trading may be complex, 
where “typically, a global trading business, through its various offices, will work on a given 
transaction or project, in varying and unpredictable degrees, developing, monitoring, 
negotiating, and concluding transactions on an ongoing 24-hour basis worldwide”.58 
 As global trading is a by-product of the motivational factors behind entering a foreign 
market, most multinational banks undertake at least a proportion of global trading. Global 
trading raises tax questions such as whether cross-border trading conducted in a foreign 
country constitutes a permanent establishment, how to determine income attributable to an 
existing permanent establishment and how to apply transfer pricing methods.59 
 The increase in global trading is driven by the global demand created by the clients of 
banks, both borrowers and investors. In particular, the global market established by 
traditional multinational entities created a demand for the innovative financial instruments 
subsequently developed by multinational banks.60 An explosive growth of these innovative 
financial instruments has occurred over the last 25 years.61 More recently, sophisticated 
derivative instruments have been created by multinational banks to allow multinational 
entities to manage risk themselves.62 Technological development has accelerated this 
process of financial globalisation.63 By responding to the demand created, multinational 
banks have facilitated the efficient operation of the financial markets.  
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  Contributing to this growth in global trading was the broadening and deepening of the 
customer base which occurred in the late 1980s, concurrent with an awareness among tax 
administrators of the unique tax issues relating to the function of global trading undertaken 
by the financial institutions. While technological, economic and regulatory developments 
contributed to the expansion of global financial trading,64 such expansion would not have 
occurred without the increased international trade of traditional multinational entities. This 
concept of the multinational banks arising out of the needs of traditional multinational 
entities is explored further later in this article. 
 The rising role of global trading undertaken by multinational banks, which consists of a 
number of functions, can generally be categorised into trading, sales and marketing, 
management, and supporting functions.65 The commonality among these service roles is that 
they may be conducted across a number of jurisdictions simultaneously. It is this feature 
which further distinguishes the services provided by multinational banks from those of other 
multinational entities, which are normally restricted by geographical boundaries. New 
technologies expedite tremendously the cross-border capabilities of these financial service 
organisations as compared with manufacturers.66 
 The consequence of this lack of geographical restriction, because of the types of services 
being offered, is that the tax position of multinational banks may not correspond with 
economic reality.67 The growth in financial instruments, and the consequential global 
trading, has outpaced the evolution of tax rules, which means that such situations are not 
adequately dealt with.68 
 Manipulation by a multinational bank may result in less than single taxation but, more 
fundamentally, it may result in an outcome that fails to accord with economic reality. It is 
the proposition of this article that this taxation irregularity is exacerbated for multinational 
banks because of the nature of their services and consequent products. Adding to this 
irregularity is the fact that the service role may be conducted across multiple jurisdictions 
simultaneously. By acting as intermediaries, multinational banks operate seamlessly across 
borders, through a web of subsidiaries, branches and representative offices. This allows for 
distortion both through the application of the current source regime as well as the arm’s 
length requirement of the transfer-pricing regime. 
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 The principal tax consequence of the intermediary services provided by multinational 
banks is the ability of the banks to perform these services for clients anywhere in the world 
while providing the product in a low-tax jurisdiction. An application of the current source 
rules may then result in the jurisdiction where the services are performed failing to receive 
any tax revenue. The OECD 1998 discussion draft suggests that there are further tax 
consequences.69 It suggests that there are four aspects of multinational bank dealings that 
increase the likelihood of a distortion of the taxation position from the aim of the traditional 
regime. The first aspect is the fact that, inherent in the nature of global trading, there is a 
necessity to delegate some marketing or trading authority to affiliates. The question then 
raised is whether the affiliate is acting as a dependent agent for the purposes of determining 
whether a permanent establishment exists. The second aspect relates to the difficulties that 
arise in allocating profits among the jurisdictions because of the integrated nature of global 
trading. The third aspect is the mobile nature of capital, a commodity heavily relied upon by 
multinational banks, which allows expected profits or losses to be transferred between 
jurisdictions. The fourth aspect is the lack of accounting and regulatory standards.70 
4.2 The growth and evolution of multinational banks 
The relatively late arrival of most multinational banks into the international arena, their 
distinguishing features from other multinational entities and the unique nature of taxation 
consequences for multinational banks are best illustrated in light of a consideration of the 
history of multinational banking in a global context. This section addresses the evolution of 
multinational banks, as a subset of multinational entities, within the framework of both the 
demand driven by multinational clients and internalisation theory. 
 Before embarking on an examination of the history of multinational banking, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the lack of common terminology, and the hampering effect this 
has had on any substantive research into the economic consequences and taxation issues 
relating to multinational entities in general and multinational banks specifically. Prior to the 
study of the multinational entity per se, an entity involved in such activities was examined in 
the context of foreign direct investment or the business corporation.71 It was not until nearly 
two centuries after the beginning of the multinational entity that the first term used to 
describe the phenomenon, the “multinational corporation”, was coined.72 In 1960, Lilienthal 
described multinational corporations as “corporations which have their home in one country 
but operate and live under the laws and customs of other countries as well”.73  
 The consequence of the lack of a defined term describing such behaviour was that 
regulation and tax policy, until relatively recently, was considered within the framework of 
international investment as a whole, rather than being split into the necessary subcategories, 
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 foreign direct investment being one. It has been demonstrated that a multinational entity 
deals internationally in a particular way, that is, the entity owns and controls income-
generating assets in more than one country. Any research into international trade, however, 
was done in a much broader context. 
 The first significant modern analysis of the special features of investment by a 
multinational entity has been attributed to Australia.74 Economists in Australia were alerted 
to the unique nature of the multinational entity and its investment and profit distribution 
strategies through the sudden expansion of General Motors Holden in the 1950s. The 
impetus for investigation into the economic effects was the transfer of US$4.5 million, out 
of a reported 1953 profit of US$9.8 million, to the United States as a dividend.75 Although 
the modern multinational entity had been in existence prior to this, both in Australia and 
other jurisdictions, this study was the first to consider the effects of foreign direct 
investment, concluding that such effects are unique.  
 Because of the lack of terminology and academic literature, it is generally assumed that 
the multinational entity is a post-war phenomenon. This type of structure, however, is a 
feature of modern commerce as old as modern mercantilism. Though there is no doubt that 
the growth of the multinational entity in the post-war period has been remarkable,76 the 
beginnings of the multinational entity can be traced back to foreign direct investment in 
Europe centuries before.77 Traditionally, the manufacturing market was the leader of 
multinational firms, initially facilitated through the inventions of the steamship, railway and 
telegraph.78 Over time, this geographical diversification of the firm, initiated at a domestic 
level, has refined itself and transformed into the multinational entity.  
 Similarly, multinational banking has a long history, with evidence of international 
banking (as contrasted with multinational banking) in Babylonia as early as 465 BC.79 
Despite the steady rise of a geographically diversified banking services market, as recently 
as three decades ago banks were excluded from discussions of multinational entities. For 
example, Aharoni in his 1971 article suggests that the definition of the multinational entity 
can be subdivided by three criteria: the types of operations in which they are involved; the 
size of their operations; and the areas in which they operate.80 Corporations, according to the 
types of operations in which they are involved, are divided into exporters, importers, 
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transporters, manufacturers, traders and petroleum producers. The obvious omission from 
this list is the service provider, in which category the multinational bank would fall. 
Multinational entities were thought to be providers of goods rather than services; an 
assumption, it could be argued, that legislators have also made. 
 Over the course of the last three decades it has been acknowledged that banking has 
become a multinational service. The issue then is to why banks have become multinational. 
To address this, two theories have been devised. The first, a demand-driven argument, is that 
one consequence of the modern multinational entity is the need for more geographically 
diversified financial arrangements and products, hence the services market, including 
banking, gradually entered the multinational arena.81 Casson believes that “[t]he growth of 
foreign direct investment in manufacturing by high-technology mass-market-oriented firms 
created a new demand for corporate banking services overseas”.82 In essence, “the multi-
nationalisation of manufacturing firms creates a derived demand for the multi-
nationalisation of banks as well”.83 
 The emergence of the multinational bank, therefore, has followed the emergence of the 
traditional manufacturing multinational entity, with growth in recent decades. Banks have 
become multinational not because of the income opportunities presented by foreign 
jurisdictions but, rather, for fear of losing their domestic clientele if they failed to follow 
those clients overseas.84 This theory on the global expansion of banks has been termed the 
“defensive expansion approach”, that is, banks are being reactive rather than proactive in 
ensuring their client base does not diminish.85 
 A counter argument to the defensive expansion approach is that banks followed their 
customers overseas not for fear of losing their domestic base, but because of the knowledge 
advantage they possess. This knowledge advantage is borne of the client-bank relationship, 
and becomes a public good within the firm which can be best exploited by expanding 
offshore. This argument is founded in the theory of internalisation.86 As enunciated by 
Plummer:  
 Internalisation is about imperfections in intermediate product markets. Intermediate 
products flow between activities within the production sector. Market imperfections 
generate transaction costs and these costs are often minimised for the sector as a whole 
by bringing interdependent activities under common ownership and control.87 
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  Implicit in the internalisation theory are the assumptions that: the primary goal of any 
capitalist entity is to maximise profit, and as part of achieving that goal, minimise expense; 
and there is an imperfect market.88 Internalisation theory explains why multinational banks 
exploit their ownership advantages within their own system rather than contracting them in a 
regular market where there are imperfections.89 
 Clearly, banks are profit-driven entities and are internalising a market failure, 
information asymmetry.90 That is, due to the existence of information asymmetry, the 
expense of international banking transactions is minimised if conducted by multinational 
banks rather than by independent entities. The decrease in expense is due to the intangible 
nature of the asset; in particular, the fact that it is difficult to efficiently transfer the 
information and, further, the fact that it is difficult to accurately price the value of the 
information. This information cost-saving is the motivation for domestic banks expanding 
into multinational banks. It is important to note that information asymmetry would not be a 
valuable asset were it not for the global expansion of the banks’ clientele. This 
internalisation hypothesis encompasses most of the extant theories as to the multinational 
expansion of banks.  
 This theory, while not explicitly adopted, seems to be inherent in the tax literature. For 
example, Colon explains that the driving force behind the “continuing creation of new 
financial instruments is the demand for cost effective mechanisms by which firms can 
manage their financial price risks – the risks firms face due to unexpected movements in 
foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices”.91 What is very much accepted 
in the tax literature is that there are the economic advantages to becoming multinational.92 
 Whether driven by a compulsion to follow clients or driven by internalisation theory, it 
is clear that multinational banks are a product of the globalisation of business and the 
establishment of traditional multinational entities. Although it is often stated that 
technological development, financial innovation and the political economy have all 
contributed to the global trading of multinational banks,93 all of these factors are associated 
with demand, driven by traditional multinational entities. Technological advances allow the 
clients of multinational banks to participate in international transactions, while the 
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innovative financial products allow for greater protection against risk. The political 
economy, by no longer restricting the transfer of capital, has also allowed interested parties 
to become involved. The increasing number of international dealings and transactions, both 
related and unrelated, has created a market demand for multinational banks and the services 
that they provide. The multinational bank, therefore, is not a traditional multinational entity 
but rather a product of the traditional multinational entity. 
 Being a product of the traditional multinational entity, it is suggested that it is difficult to 
apply tax rules designed for that traditional multinational entity to a relatively new 
phenomenon. While critics of the current transfer pricing regime have always argued that it 
fails to take into account the synergistic advantages of the multinational entity, due to the 
highly integrated nature of the services provided by multinational banks as well as the 
intangible nature of the assets being dealt in, the problems of ignoring such synergistic 
advantages are exacerbated. Rather than expanding internationally to meet the needs of a 
new market, multinational banks are expanding internationally to meet the needs of existing 
clients. Synergies, therefore, are taken to the extreme. This difficulty is then compounded by 
the unique nature of the intermediary services being offered. 
4.3 Monopolistic advantages and network linkages 
There are two further, interwoven distinguishing characteristics in relation to the services of 
the multinational bank; the monopolistic advantages and the network linkages. First, the 
monopolistic nature of multinational banking, with the personal contact advantage providing 
synthesis of information, is a basis for distinguishing the commerce of multinational banks 
from those of traditional multinational entities. This information is the basis of the service 
that the multinational bank is providing and is a bank-specific asset. 
 A manufacturer has product and/or technology advantages with the potential to transfer 
that knowledge to foreign jurisdictions. A bank, on the other hand, has the personal contact 
advantage. This leads to the creation of a network of information with team-specific skills 
being developed to synthesise bank information.94 Such monopolistic advantages add to the 
source and transfer pricing problems because of the unique nature of multinational banks. 
These problems are founded primarily in the integrated and exclusive nature of the 
information possessed by the multinational banks. Essentially, the integrated nature of the 
information network means that it is difficult to apply any traditional legal source rule to 
obtain a result reflecting economic reality. Using a traditional arm’s length methodology to 
price any related party transactions is also unachievable as, due to the exclusive nature of the 
transferred services, there are no comparable unrelated transactions. 
 Related to the monopolistic advantages of multinational banks are the highly 
sophisticated network linkages within multinational banks. When considering the network 
structure of multinational banks in comparison with vertically integrated multinational 
entities, there are two special features. The first special feature is the flow between the 
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 facilities that is two-way, unlike manufacturing multinational entities where the process is 
more likely to be unidirectional. The second special feature is that there are several different 
locations involved in the network, creating a complex set of linkages.95 Such a network is 
less likely to be achieved by a manufacturing multinational entity because of the physical 
nature of the product. 
 These distinguishing features add to the problems created by the multinational banks’ 
compulsion to follow clients. Not only are there synergies with respect to the client base and 
information, but there is also the personal contact advantage providing a synthesis of 
information. Essentially this leads to a highly integrated multinational entity that is 
effectively impossible to separate into its components. The difficulties in attempting to do so 
suggest that it is a fiction to determine the hypothesised independent entity for the 
application of the transfer pricing regime, particularly to permanent establishments. 
 The services and consequent products of multinational banks are distinct from those of 
traditional multinational entities, primarily due to their intermediary nature. Three further 
distinguishing features underlie and compound the taxation problems associated with this 
intermediary nature. First, the ability of services of the multinational banks to be 
implemented simultaneously across multiple jurisdictions is in stark contrast to the unitary 
nature of multinational entity transactions. Secondly, multinational bank services are often a 
result of the demand of traditional multinational entities and, finally, the personal contact 
advantage held by multinational banks is fundamentally different to the product and 
technological advantages held by traditional multinational entities.  
 It is the contention of this article that, in addition to the service and product differences, 
organisational differences between traditional multinational entities and multinational banks 
render the rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income in the current tax 
regime unsuitable for multinational banks.  
5 THE UNIQUE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Due to the role of multinational banks in servicing traditional multinational entities, the 
organisational structure of the multinational bank, designed to meet client demand, diverges 
from that of the traditional multinational entity. While the current tax model is designed for 
traditional multinational entities, the different structure of multinational banks introduces 
issues previously not recognised by the traditional taxation system. It is the unique 
organisational structure of the multinational bank that this part of the article examines. 
 The growth of multinational entities, and consequently multinational banks, establishes 
that financial markets are becoming increasingly globalised and integrated.96 The 
development of the multinational bank also requires a consideration of why these entities 
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choose to become involved in the international market through foreign direct investment 
rather than merely exporting their services from the parent jurisdiction or by operating 
through an agent. By doing so, it is possible to consider whether banks are unique not only 
because of their unique service qualities but also because of their organisational structure. 
5.1 Entering the market through foreign direct investment 
A bank wishing to enter a foreign market may do so in a number of ways. The bank has 
three choices. The first choice is to enter the market by exporting the services from the 
parent jurisdiction to the foreign jurisdiction. This involves little in the way of physical or 
capital presence in the foreign jurisdiction. The second choice is to enter a foreign market by 
operating through a local agent, usually a bank already existing within the foreign 
jurisdiction. The third choice is to enter a foreign market through foreign direct investment. 
Where the third option is undertaken, the multinational bank accesses the market using one 
of three trading structures: foreign subsidiary, foreign branch or foreign representative 
office. Regardless of the specific organisational form, however, foreign direct investment 
implies the transfer of capital, managerial expertise and the technological assets of a bank 
from one country to another.97 
 Although not unique to the enterprise of banking, the third option of foreign direct 
investment98 is the preferred method of foreign market entrance adopted by banks. As such, 
it is important to consider this specific geographical expansion strategy to determine the 
associated unique taxation consequences. This choice of investment strategy is referred to as 
foreign direct investment because “the defining mark of a multinational is that it makes and 
manages direct investments in foreign countries”.99 Thus, foreign direct investment may be 
achieved without a physical presence in the foreign jurisdiction; however, capital investment 
is necessary.100 For example, a bank can invest offshore by buying shares or bonds. Clearly, 
this can be distinguished from a manufacturing entity, where investment in its line of 
business requires a physical presence. Foreign direct investment, in the economic sense, 
involves any investment by an entity which it has ultimate control over. 
 Direct investment has been more comprehensively defined as an activity which consists 
of four dimensions: a transfer of capital, a control investment, a source of funds for foreign 
operations and a balance of payments flow.101 According to Eng, Francis and Mauer: 
 direct foreign investment involves transferring capital from a source or home country to 
a host country. In comparison with other forms of international investment, the 
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 distinguishing feature for FDI [foreign direct investment] is the element of control over 
management policy and decisions.102 
The two prerequisites for foreign direct investment, therefore, are a transfer of capital and 
control. Economists provide an insight into the reasons for pursuing such investment 
strategies. 
 Fieldhouse, quoting from Plummer,103 suggests that there are three main reasons for the 
establishment of what he refers to as international combines or trusts (or what are 
contemporarily called multinational entities):104 
 the need to keep plants fully employed; desire to escape from severe competition, price 
cutting and so on; and … the desire to substitute certainty for the uncertainties of 
business as previously conducted.105 
 Plummer’s reasons are a precursor to “internalisation” and, as discussed previously, 
according to this theory multinational banks are internalising the market failure of 
information asymmetry. Internalisation explains how the multinational entity achieves the 
goal of cost reduction.  
 Costs associated with the external market, which can be avoided through the 
establishment of a multinational entity, include: brokerage costs; costs of defining the 
obligations of the contracting parties; the risk of scheduling and the related input costs; and 
the taxes paid on the transactions.106 In the case of multinational banks, the costs which are 
commonly avoided by becoming multinational are the costs associated with intangible 
assets; in particular, the cost of effectively transferring information and the cost of 
accurately determining the sales value of the information.107 
 Such benefits have been recognised in tax literature when considering an economically 
valid basis for establishing jurisdictional allocation of income. For example, Bird provides: 
 in the absence of such “intangible assets” that can be exploited by multinational 
enterprises, it would be hard to understand their existence at all, let alone their 
dominance in important fields, since foreigners are inherently at a disadvantage 
compared to local firms unless they have some offsetting internal advantages as a result 
of being under common control.108 
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 Cho, in addressing the issue of why banks choose to operate in foreign jurisdictions 
through foreign direct investment, suggests that three questions should be answered 
simultaneously: what advantages does a bank have which allow it to compete against local 
and/or other foreign banks; why is a foreign rather than a domestic operation advantageous 
in serving foreign and/or domestic markets; and why does a bank choose to exploit these 
advantages itself rather than selling them to local and/or other foreign banks?109 
 In answering these questions, it must be remembered that there is the general view that 
multinational banks arose from the demand produced by the increase in foreign direct 
investment in manufacturing by high-technology mass-market-oriented firms. Economic 
theory regards this as the defensive expansion approach, which some economists regard as a 
specific application of internalisation theory rather than a separate theory as outlined 
above.110 In explaining defensive expansion in the context of internalisation theory, 
Williams points out: 
 The growth in multinational banking is due to foreign direct investment abroad by 
corporations. Banks respond to the expansion of their clients abroad to defend their 
client-bank relationship. If the banks do not accompany their client abroad, the client 
will establish a banking relationship that could expand to supplant any domestic banking 
relationships. A banking relationship consists of a flow of information. This flow of 
information enables the bank to assess any new loan proposal at low marginal cost, as 
most of the assessment has occurred previously. This lower marginal cost gives a bank’s 
offshore subsidiary a competitive advantage over its incumbent competitors. Due to 
market failure, this information flow cannot be traded or priced within the market and so 
must be exploited by owning banks.111 
 This theory is consistent with evidence of expansion into certain jurisdictions. For 
example, it has been suggested that most banks came to Australia “as part of a reluctant 
world wide globalisation that was based on a defensive mentality rather than an aggressive 
strategy”.112 
 If the economists’ view is accepted that banks capitalise on these market imperfections 
(namely, the restraints on trading and pricing customer information) purely to defend their 
client-bank relationships, then their adoption of the foreign direct investment method is 
rational. Not only does the foreign direct investment approach give the banks a global 
presence, it also gives them control over that presence. When compared to the alternative 
organisational structures of exporting their services or operating through an agent, it is this 
higher level of control associated with foreign direct investment that enables the banks to 
effectively “defend” their client-bank relationships as required. Expanding, therefore, on 
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 what is already accepted in relation to economic theory explaining multinational banking as 
discussed earlier, this article accepts the defensive expansion approach, as a subset of the 
internalisation theory, as the basis for the adoption of foreign direct investment by 
multinational banks.  
 In this context, foreign direct investment is broadly defined to include the three 
alternative trading structures adopted by multinational banks: foreign subsidiaries, foreign 
branches and foreign representative offices. A subsidiary operates as an independent legal 
entity as distinct from the foreign bank, being separately chartered under the laws of the 
local country.113 Subsidiaries are generally wholly-owned, or at least controlled, by the 
foreign parent bank.114 In contrast, a branch is an integral part of the foreign bank without a 
separate legal personality.115 Of even less independence is a representative office which is “a 
small office in the host nation that coordinates a bank’s correspondent banking relationships 
and renders assistance to the bank’s existing customers”.116 While the level of independence 
of each of these three structures differs, they are all vertically integrated organisation 
models. This is contrasted with the generally horizontally integrated nature of the traditional 
multinational entity. 
 Entering a foreign market through foreign direct investment does not make a 
multinational bank unique. What does make it unique is the lack of a large physical presence 
required in a jurisdiction. It is very simple for a bank to establish a subsidiary or branch 
(permanent establishment) in a given jurisdiction and to undertake transactions through that 
office. While very little in the way of intermediary activity may be undertaken in that 
location, in fact, a large percentage of the source of income under the current legal source 
rules may be attributable to that office and hence that jurisdiction. There are also unique tax 
issues that arise because of the transfer of capital to a potentially low tax jurisdiction in 
order to take advantage of the source rules. The transfer of capital of itself raises transfer 
pricing issues, with the arm’s length requirement for pricing such a transfer often failing to 
replicate economic reality. The external market costs mentioned above are ignored for these 
purposes and, as such, the result is not an optimal one.  
 
5.2 Alternate trading models and the highly integrated nature of the multinational 
bank 
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To evaluate the current jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income principles, it is necessary 
to consider whether the structure and behaviour of the multinational bank mirrors that of the 
traditional manufacturing multinational entity. While the governing economic principles 
behind the structure and behaviour are the same, the way that these principles operate in 
practice may be different.117 The reason for this is the way in which the entity establishes its 
operations. Manufacturing multinational entities are traditionally, and more commonly, 
horizontally integrated, while multinational banks tend to be vertically integrated.118 A 
horizontally integrated multinational entity provides the same goods and/or services from 
several different locations, while the vertically integrated multinational entity has one 
location producing output, which becomes input at the next location.119 This type of 
integration leads to novel transfer pricing issues.120 Where the multinational entity is 
vertically integrated, it is difficult to find comparables, as often they simply do not exist.121 
The reason these comparables do not exist is that they have been driven out of the 
marketplace. Lebowitz explains: 
 For example, if a parent-subsidiary relationship turns out generally to be more 
profitable in an industry than contractual arrangements between unrelated parties, one 
can expect that vertical integration will become the dominant, and ultimately the only, 
mode of economic organization in the industry because competition will render 
independent party relationships economically unviable. When that occurs, as it often 
has, for example, in relationships between manufacturers and distributors, the arm’s-
length standard becomes useless because it relies on references to transactions that have 
become extinct.122 
 Within this vertical integration, there are three trading models which a multinational 
bank can adopt: the centralised product management model; separate entity model; and 
functionally fully integrated model (integrated trading model).123 The models can be 
represented along a continuum: the integrated trading model at one end, centralised product 
management model in the middle and the separate trading model at the opposite end.124 A 
multinational bank may use a combination of these models according to the various services 
offered and products being traded.  
 The integrated trading model has traders in separate international jurisdictions trading 
off the same portfolio of positions. This is what is known as a “book”, the responsibility for 
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 which is passed from one location to the next as the market closes in one jurisdiction and 
opens in the next. The integrated trading model is a true global trading model.125 The 
primary concern of the multinational bank operating under the integrated trading model is 
the time zone. Essentially, all functions can be performed in any of the multinational bank’s 
locations and, at any given time, will be performed where the market is open. At one time 
this type of model was regarded the exception rather than the norm, but it is now becoming 
the more prevalent mode of operation.126 
 The centralised product management model has a central location accepting and 
managing all risk associated with a particular product with separate branches managing 
separate products. Various commercial factors, such as market liquidity, ease of hedging, 
competition, business strategy, location of customers and skilled staff, influence the location 
of the centralised trading site.127 This centralised trading site is essentially a head office into 
which all other parts of the entity report.  
 The separate enterprise model has each location operating as if it were a separate profit 
centre. Under this model, each location, whether a subsidiary or branch, has its own 
marketers and traders and its own books reflecting the activities of that location.128 Provided 
the branch or subsidiary does not trade outside its trading limits, the central committee will 
not control any transactions undertaken by the individual locations.  
 No matter which model is adopted, global trading operations within financial 
intermediaries perform four general functions: trading, sales, management and support.129 
These four elements of the structure introduce their own unique qualities. On one hand, 
trading is divided into product groups, rather than geographical locations, with traders being 
rewarded on profitability as a whole. Management, on the other hand, may have 
responsibilities restricted to product, clients, economic sectors or particular markets. Sales 
staff will generally be responsible for a portfolio of clients and, as such, are cross-
jurisdictional. Finally, the support team are responsible for the integrated entity as a whole, 
primarily offering support to ensure that global transactions are accomplished.  
 These trading models not only distinguish the multinational bank from its more 
traditional counterparts but also raise unique tax problems. Again, both source issues and 
transfer pricing issues arise. First, even if the legal source is easy to ascertain, given the 
three alternate trading models, it is argued that this may not be the economic source of the 
income. Secondly, transfer pricing issues arise because of the highly integrated nature of the 
models and the lack of comparable independent third party transactions. 
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5.3 Servicing clients through appropriate locations 
The final characteristic of the multinational bank, which differentiates its organisational 
structure from traditional multinational entities, is location. Multinational banks are more 
likely to be concerned with servicing time zones rather than geographical locations.130 This 
is because a multinational bank is concerned with ensuring that a part of its organisation is 
always operating.131 Banks will also be managed along the lines of products rather than 
along geographical boundaries.132 Consequentially, it is suggested that tax rules based on 
such geographical locations is inconsistent with the objectives of the multinational bank. 
 Despite this concern with time zones, multinational banks need to be geographically 
located. The choice of location, however, is also grounds for concluding that multinational 
banks are unique. There are two reasons for the location of banks being distinct from that of 
manufacturing industries. The first reason is that commercial (deposit) banks need to be 
located where the customer resides. The second reason is that trade banks and investment 
banks need to be located in just a few centres, but those which are major financial centres. 
For example, a multinational bank will usually have offices operating in New York, London 
and Tokyo.133 Essentially, because a bank is providing services rather than goods, it is easier 
to have fewer offices dispensing services across a larger area than to have numerous offices 
each servicing smaller regions. Provided there is representation in each time zone, a client 
can be fully serviced.  
6 A POSSIBLE SOLUTION? 
The unique differences between traditional multinational entities and multinational banks 
mean there may be the need for a distinct international tax regime for the taxation result to 
reflect economic reality. An examination of the unique nature of multinational banks leads 
to the conclusion that the appropriate tax treatment of these banks may be different from the 
appropriate tax treatment of multinational entities more generally. While it is not the 
purpose of this article to critique an alternative taxation model, one such model is suggested 
as an alternative that is worthy of further investigation. 
 An alternative to the current regime taxing multinational banks that may be investigated 
in the future is unitary taxation based on global formulary apportionment. It may be argued 
that this is a theoretically superior model that would tax multinational banks in a manner 
reflecting economic reality. Unitary taxation is the taxation of the worldwide income of a 
multinational entity and is normally based on a formulary apportionment method, which 
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 allocates income to the relevant jurisdictions based on a percentage of the worldwide profits 
of the multinational entity.134  
 Formulary apportionment does not solve all of the issues associated with the current 
international tax rules governing jurisdiction and allocation of income.135 It does remain, 
however, a potential solution to many of the problems associated with the separate entity 
approach136 and recognises the consequences of globalisation by multinational entities.137 
Principally, it removes the requirement to identify and price internal transactions.138 
Furthermore, it provides a complete solution to the issue of allocation of profits between 
relevant jurisdictions where there is international acceptance of this model.139 As such, many 
of the issues which arise in the context of multinational banking may be resolved through a 
unitary tax model. 
 When the unitary tax model based on global formulary apportionment is applied to 
multinational banks, it has several interrelated theoretical advantages over the existing arm’s 
length model. The most significant advantage to global formulary apportionment is that, 
because multinational banks are highly integrated, unitary taxation has greater consistency 
with economic reality. Unitary taxation also conforms to the aim of efficient operations 
within the multinational bank, providing the advantage of consistency between bank policy 
and tax policy. Further, formulary apportionment has the theoretical advantage of aspiring to 
the aim of finding an equitable split of profits between the jurisdictions which should 
ultimately be the overall aim of any taxation regime.140 There are also consequential 
practical advantages arising out of the implementation of unitary taxation based on 
formulary apportionment. As such, this model is worthy of further consideration. 
7 CONCLUSION 
It has been demonstrated that multinational banks, as a subset of multinational entities, have 
grown due to the demand generated by their multinational entity clients and due to their 
internalisation and capitalisation of valuable client-relationship information. Such growth 
has primarily been in the form of foreign direct investment which, under the defensive 
expansion approach, allows banks to have ownership and control in foreign markets. It is 
this vertical foreign direct investment structure, often in locations based on time zones rather 
 
134 Eden, n 23, p 36. 
135 Coffill EJ and Prentiss W Jr, “Federal Formulary Apportionment as an Alternative to ALP: From the Frying Pan to the Fire” 
(1993) 59 Tax Notes 1103 at 1116. 
136 Graetz, n 5 at 1420-1421. 
137 Avery Jones JF, “Are Tax Treaties Necessary” (1999) 53 Tax L Rev 1 at 37. 
138 Weiner JM, “The European Union and Formula Apportionment: Caveat Emptor” (2001) 41 European Taxation 380 at 381. 
139 OECD, n 22, para 3.73. 
140 Green, n 1 at 67. 
 
than geographical zones, in conjunction with the unique nature of their services and the 
associated monopolistic advantages and network linkages, which distinguishes multinational 
banks from traditional multinational entities. This distinction is particularly poignant in 
relation to taxation issues of source and transfer pricing. 
 The unique character traits and structure of multinational banks provides the platform 
for an examination concerning the appropriateness to multinational banks of the current tax 
rules of jurisdiction and allocation, and the current economic assumptions surrounding the 
taxation of multinational entities. This examination of the multinational bank within an 
economic framework facilitates a consideration of how these entities should be taxed, and 
whether, due to their unique character traits and structure, multinational banks should be 
subject to a different tax regime than traditional multinational entities.  
 This article concludes that a separate tax regime for multinational banks should be 
investigated and offers unitary taxation based on global formulary apportionment as one 
possible solution. 
